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NEBRASKA: Laws 1933, c. 65. Authorizes courts to stay proceedings upon application
and cause shown, and to fix terms as to possession, crops, care of property, taxes,
etc.
See c. 41 for a provision depriving the courts of power to enter a deficiency judg-
ment, without recital of the emergency as its justification and no limitation as to
duration of the provision.
NORTH CAROLINA: Laws of 1933, c. 275. Fair value of the land (not sale price) to de-
termine deficiency judgment.
NORTH DAKOTA: Laws of 1933, c. 157. Extends all periods of redemption for an addi-
tional year. No compensation provided. This act held invalid in State v. Klein,
249 N.W. i18 (N.D. 1933) except as to mortgages subsequent to act.
C. x58. Foreclosure by advertisement abolished except on mortgages held by the
State or by the University.
OREGON: (1933) H. J. R. 2. Appoints a joint committee to consider the subject and
introduce a bill, but apparently no legislation passed.
Sours DAxOTA: Laws of 1933, c. 135. Foreclosures by advertisement suspended when
requested by mortgagor.
C. 137. Redemption period extended additional year on condition that the
mortgagor pay taxes, back interest, interest since the sale, interest one year in ad-
vance, and the costs of the foreclosure.
C. 138. Prohibits deficiency judgments.
NVISCONSMn: Laws of 1931 (Special Session), c. 29, § 7. Extends period of redemption
additional year, mortgagor to pay taxes and interest.
Laws of 1933, c. 1I, 125.
BRITISH AND AMERICAN UTILITIES: A COMPARISON
MARsnALL E. DimocK*
W HILE Great Britain (and most European countries for that matter)
has been experimenting with mixed undertakings and public utility
trusts, our American states have been content to muddle along with the
railroad and public utility commissions in forty-seven states.' Public utility
regulation is preeminently American, although the public utility concept
was derived from English rather than from American sources.2 In contrast
with the maze of learned articles on public utilities which have been pro-
duced by American writers, information on British public utilities is
• Associate Professor of Public Administration, University of Chicago.
'Mosher and Crawford, Public Utility Regulation, New York, 1933. Delaware is the only
state that has not created a public utility commission.
2 B. P. McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 Harv. L.
Rev. 759 (1930); Walton Hamilton, Affectation with a Public Interest, 39 Yale L. Jour. IO99
(1930).
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"fragmentary."3 Almost anomalously, however, the British have evi-
denced more inventiveness in dealing with public service enterprises than
have we who lay so much emphasis on public utilities. Because of par-
liamentary supremacy in Great Britain, British courts are not drawn into
"the conflict over the most controversial social and economic issues of the
day" as are American courts because of questions involving due process
of law. The law relative to valuation and expropriation is more definite
in Great Britain than it is in the United States. The British rule may be
compared with Mr. Justice Brandeis' "prudent investment theory," 4 and
hence, theoretically at least, it avoids the horns of the original "cost
versus the reproduction cost" dilemma. The courts will not set aside rates
established by Parliament when the owners contend that such schedules
are confiscatory. The upshot of all this is legislative and administrative
control, and the avoidance of expensive and almost continuous litigation.
A comparison of British methods of public utility organization, control,
and management possibly may suggest some modifications and new de-
partures for the United States whereby the widespread criticism of com-
mission regulation and the new problems arising out of the federal recon-
struction program may be met.5
THE TRADITIONAL METHODS OF REGULATION
The legislative and administrative techniques of regulation in the
United States were patterned closely on those which had evolved in Great
Britain in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Although Parlia-
ment had imposed restrictions on inns, roads, canals, water, gas, and other
essential services at an earlier period,6 the regulation of railways between
1854 and 1873 furnished the real institutional foundation for both British
and American public utility regulation. The railway commission which
was established by Parliament in c873, and which was superseded by the
Railway and Canal Commission in 1888, laid the foundation for the In-
3 The writer's book, British Public Utilities, is in press. It represents a year's research as a
Social Science Research fellow.
4 State of Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of
Missouri, et al, 262 U.S. 276, 308, 43 Sup. Ct. 544, 553, 67 L. Ed. 98r, 994, 31 A. L. R. 807
(1922).
5 The Federal Trade Commission investigations of electrical utilities; The Knight Com-
mission Report in New York, 1930; the Pennsylvania investigation of 1931, the Massachusetts
inquiry, 193o, and the sweeping changes in the Oregon law, 193o, are symptomatic. See Wil-
liam E. Mosher, Electrical Utilities: The Crisis in Public Control (New York, 1929); Mosher
and Crawford, Public Utility Regulation (New York, 1933); and Keezer and May, The Public
Control of Business (New York, 1930).
6 F. N. Keen, The Law Relating to Public Service Undertakings (London, X925), c. i.
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terstate Commerce Commission in x887A. Although laissez faire was "a
local and temporary expedient," and a marked exception to the long and
continuous history of state control,8 the so-called intervention of the state
in the progress of railway development after 1873 marked the end of the
period of uncontrolled business expansion and signalized the beginning of
the modem period of public utility regulation. For the first time perma-
nent administrative machinery was created for the supervision of under-
takings which had been given rights of eminent domain and monopoly
privileges. These bodies were charged with the duty of enforcing com-
pliance with legislation relative to the service, practices, and rates of pub-
lic utility companies. This was the theory of Victorian regulation, a sys-
tem of public control which was not destined to take a foothold in Europe,
and which has lost most of its popularity in Great Britain, but which is
still the standard form of public utility regulation in the United States.
The administrative tribunal is the symbol of Victorian regulation. An
agent of the legislature, identified in composition and functioning with the
administration, performing acts which are distinctly judicial, the regula-
tory commission has been one of the principal agencies of constitutional
and economic growth. The public utility commission is unknown in
Europe, where heads of departments, assisted by advisory committees,
regulate the undertakings of private companies. In most countries out-
side of the United States regulation is unimportant because the great
majority of public service undertakings are owned in whole or in part by
governmental subdivisions. Public ownership is also extensive in Great
Britain, where roughly two-thirds of the electrical distribution, forty per
cent of the gas supply, four-fifths of the local transport services, and nine-
ty per cent of the water undertakings are publicly owned and oper-
ated. 9 Dissatisfaction with regulation has been an important factor in the
expropriation of private companies and the establishment of municipally-
owned services.
In Great Britain there are public utility commissions for railways,o road
transport,"" and electricity." The greater importance attached to regula-
tion in the United States is suggested in part by the much greater number
of regulatory commissions, there being forty-seven state tribunals in addi-
71. L. Sharfman, I The Interstate Commerce Commission (ist ed. 193), c. I.
8 Herman Finer, State Activity before Adam Smith, io Public Administration, 157 (1932).
9 Liberal party, Britain's Industrial Future (1928), 68-74.
I0 The Railway and Canal Commission (i888) and the Railway Rates Tribunal (1921).
"A metropolitan commission in London and one in each of twelve provincial districts.
2The Central Electricity Board (ig9g).
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tion to the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Radio Com-
mission, and the Federal Power Commission. What do the coming years
hold in store for the British and the American public utility commissions?
Can regulation succeed, or has it failed? Is the idea of setting up one or-
ganization to watch and control another organization fundamentally
sound, or must success be expected from an unregulated operating con-
cern, either wholly or partly public in ownership and management?
The view is now widely held in Great Britain that Victorian regulation,
involving as it does the creation of one set of officials to scrutinize and
to control the actions of other officials, is definitely antiquated. Regula-
tion has not been a success. Generally speaking, the older method of regu-
lation has proved timid, inelastic, and ineffective. Dissatisfaction with
Victorian regulation does not come from the Liberals and the Socialists
alone; the Conservative party has been responsible for the creation of all
except one of the.public utility trusts. These new quasi-governmental
undertakings are regarded as an alternative to regulation. As a matter of
fact, Conservative members of Parliament are generally more outspoken
in their criticism of administrative regulation than the Liberals. There is
a widely held view among British business men that "A regulated business
is worse than no business at all." In some cases, this sweeping condemna-
tion merely represents the vehemence of a reactionary, but in the majority
of cases convincing reasons are given for discontent with continuous regu-
lation by administrative tribunals and government departments.
The traditional method of regulation is not designed to produce a public
service philosophy on the part of those who operate the undertakings.
Experience has demonstrated that this is one of the most insuperable faults
of regulation. Regulation begins with the wrong assumptions. Public con-
trol is regarded as "intervention." Profit-making for the investors re-
mains the primary consideration. Hence the relations between the utility
and the government become a game. Under the rules of the game, the
public utility officials match their wits with the regulatory officials. Serv-
ice to the public is desirable insofar as it increases business and dividends.
In other words, beginning with the assumption that all business is private
and that regulation represents onerous burdens which have been imposed
by politicians, the public utility officials are constantly on the defensive.
The stockholders judge the management's success by dividends; this
usually means that public utility officials "must get away with" as much
as possible. Watered stock, holding company juggling, lowering of qual-
ity when possible, unequal treatment of congested and undeveloped areas,
high-powered propaganda, pressure to appoint regulatory officials who
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will be "safe"-these results of regulation have flowed as naturally from
British regulation as they have from American.
It is possible to create public utilities in which voting stockholders and
elastic dividends are eliminated. This is one of the objectives underlying
the public utility trust, which begins with the assumption that the busi-
ness is public. Public service is the controlling consideration. The profit
motive and public utility service are incompatible."3 This elementary
truth seems to be more generally appreciated in Great Britain than in the
United States.
Regulation creates the wrong atmosphere. Interference is universally
resented by men in every kind of pursuit. So-called "effective" regulation
invariably involves a division of responsibility for management between
the operating officials and the regulators. The results of this system im-
pair the efficiency of the service. Responsibility cannot be definitely fixed
in every case; the quantity of restrictions is frequently considered the
measure of results; rules and regulations laid down by the legislature
usually outlive their usefulness. The regulated undertaking does not have
that elasticity and freedom of management which are necessary founda-
tions of progressive management. Experimentation is virtually impossi-
ble. The status quo tends to become the equivalent of effective regulation.
The personnel problem of British and American public utility commis-
sions has received very little attention and yet this is undoubtedly one of
the most vulnerable points of the regulatory process. The administrative
tribunal is usually commended for its "expertness," but in most cases a
candid examination reveals that this reputation is undeserved. To be sure,
men like Milo R. Maltbie, Clyde L. King, and David E. Lilienthal, who
are really technically trained commissioners, have in some cases been ap-
pointed to American tribunals. Most of the state commissions are any-
thing but expert, however. A study of the previous callings of the mem-
bers of state public utility commissions in 1929 revealed that there were
seventy-nine lawyers, thirteen engineers, five journalists, twenty-nine
business men and bankers, seventeen farmers, twelve industrial workmen,
and nine government employees, giving a total of I64.X4 Most of the ap-
pointments to American public service commissions are patently "politi-
cal." Only five American states have incorporated requirements concern-
13 "This policy" (the coordination of national transport facilities), stated members of the
Royal Commission on Transport, "can only be attained through an organization which works
for senice rather than profit." Final Report, Royal Commission on Transport, Cmd. 3751
(r93').
Z4 Francis X. Welch, The Trend from Lawyers to Laymen as Commissioners, 4 Pub. Util.
Fort. 8oi (1929).
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ing training and experience into their public utility statutes. 5 Under the
present laws, it would be very surprising if, at one time or another, most
American commissions were not considered to be "utility-controlled."
One of the foundation stones of public utility regulation in Great Brit-
ain has been the recruitment of commissioners from interest groups. Con-
vincing reasons have appeared for believing that interest representation is
usually an unsound element in public utility control.,6 The Railway Rates
Tribunal is the best example of a system of interest representation which,
until recent years, was considered an indispensable feature of public util-
ity control. The Rates Tribunal has three members, one of whom must be
a lawyer, another a trader, and the third a person who has had practical
experience in railway management. Of the present members, the lawyer
was a former railway counsel; the railway man was Vice-President of the
L.M.S. Railway; and the third member was an official of the Iron and Steel
Manufacturers' Association-a trade association which is more dependent
upon rail transport than is any other industrial group.
This is one form of "expertness," but not the one that seems to be most
desirable in the public interest. As hard as they may try, members of a
regulatory tribunal who have been associated with competitive interests
for most of their lives are never quite able to detach themselves from their
natural predilections and their former attachments. Nor are they trained
for the comprehensive, objective approach which persons like Maltbie,
King, and Lilienthal obtain from their academic training. Most persons
who have closely observed the results of interest representation in British
public utility regulation find themselves in agreement with the Liberal
Industrial Inquiry, which concluded that the representation of "inter-
ests," consumers' or other, should be discontinued. 7
Public utility regulation becomes less effective when the personnel, the
procedure, and the findings of the administrative tribunal become too
"judicial." This rather dogmatic statement is strongly supported by
British regulatory experience, and also by the records of American tribu-
nals which have become too "judicially-minded." The "administrative"
tribunal, composed of technicians, and which has created rules and stand-
ards out of its own experience, has contributed most to the improvement
of public utility regulation. 8
25 These are Nevada, Michigan, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. The best consider-
ation of personnel is found in Mosher and Crawford, Public Utility Regulation, c. 5.
,6 ith wider experience the writer has had to revise his views since writing, Special Courts
for Public Utility Cases, 2o Natil. Muni. Rev. 69i (I93').
'7 Britain's Industrial Future, 8o.
8 Wisconsin, California, and Massachusetts probably lead in this respect. For a good dis-
cussion of the differences between "administrative" and "judicial" tribunals see William A.
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The Railway and Canal Commission, which Parliament created in
1888 and whose railway jurisdiction has now almost completely disap-
peared, is the most outstanding example of "judicial" public utility regu-
lation. The chairman of the railway court, a judge of the High Court,
dominates the two lay members. The proceedings of the Commission are
almost identical to a court of law. From almost the very beginning the
business community and the railways objected to the judicial character of
the tribunal; they sought informality and the elevation of the technician.
The creation of the Railway Rates Tribunal in 1921 was largely a" revolt
against judicial regulation. The new tribunal took over most of the
jurisdiction of the Railway and Canal Commission, and in 1932 an im-
portant House of Commons committee recommended the latter's aboli-
tion.
A field survey conducted by Professors Mosher and Crawford in 193o
revealed that the public utility commissions in only two out of twenty-
eight states studied, were considered "judicially-minded."' 9 This is an
interesting-and in the writer's view an encouraging-sidelight on Ameri-
can public service commissions. The comment on the Maine commission,
as made by the investigator, is of particular interest in view of the adop-
tion of a judicial r6le by certain commissioners. It read as follows: "Dur-
ing the major portion of its history the commission has attempted to be
'judicially' minded, which in effect in many instances meant that the ad-
vantage was with the utility since the public was poorly represented in
comparison with the expert representatives of the utilities. There is more
evidence now of a 'public-minded' attitude on the part of the commis-
sion .
'2o
In the past three or four years, the trend toward "public-minded" com-
missions, as illustrated by New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Ore-
gon, seems to be due in part at least to dissatisfaction with the former
tendency to "judicialize" public utility commissions. Oregon's shift to a
one-man commission in 1930 is a striking example of the overthrow of a
commission of three members, which functioned very much like a court,
Robson, Justice and Administrative Law (London, X928), C. 3, 6; the reader is also referred to
Dean Roscoe Pound, Administrative Application of Legal Standards, American Bar Associa-
tion Reports, 445 (ioI9).
"Seventeen commissions were adjudged "utility-minded," six (Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nevada, New Hampshire, Vermont, and California) were considered "public-minded," and no
opinion was hazarded in the case of two states. Public Utility Regulation, op. cit., supra, note i,
57 n.
20 Ibid.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
and the substitution of a commissioner who is responsible to the Governor,
and who acts as the consumers' champion.21
There are two defects from which American public utility regulation
suffers, namely frequent appeals and great expense, which are not found
in British regulation. The principal reason for the difference-judicial re-
view of legislation and due process of law-have already been mentioned.
Then too, Parliament has made it dearer than has Congress or the state
legislatures that administrative finality is really demanded. Although the
customary statutory distinction is drawn between "fact" and "law," the
British courts have not shown a tendency to develop absorptive theories,
as have American courts, regarding "jurisdictional facts" and "mixed
questions of law and fact. ' 2 2 As a matter of fact, only six decisions of the
Railway Rates Tribunal have been appealed in ten years, and the Com-
mission was sustained in all except two of them.
The comparative cost of public utility regulation in Great Britain is no
where near so great as in the United States. The avoidance of protracted
and expensive litigation is the principal reason for this. The fixed ex-
penses of American public service commissions are nominal, amount-'
ing to only $7,I00,000 for state regulation in I929-i930.23 Regulation is
seriously impaired because of inadequate appropriations. New York,
which has a comparatively large budget, has attempted to regulate utili-
ties with an investment of upwards of $3,ooo,ooo,ooo, on appropriations
approximating $1,000,000!4 The heavy financial load which is passed on
to the consumers is primarily the result of appeals to state and federal
courts.2 ,  "The present enfeeblement of utility administration by the
states," Felix Frankfurter has stated, "is in no small measure due to inter-
ference in administration by the lower federal courts. ' '26 The New York
Telephone case alone cost the company, in the period between i9i9 and
1929, about $5,000,000.27 This figure did not include the commission's
or the courts' expenses, all of which must ultimately be borne by the con-
sumer. As Mr. Justice Brandeis once observed, "The public relations of
21 Marshall E. Diimock, The Prospect for Administrative Tribunals, 20 Cal. L. Rev. 162.
(X932); Guy S. Claire, Recent Utility Regulation in Oregon, ix Ore. L. Rev. 338 (1932).
-John Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law (Cambridge, 1927),
c. 6, 11; Kenneth F. Burgess, Recent Attempts to Immunize Commission Orders Against Judi-
cial Review, 16 Iowa L. Rev. 53 (i930).
'3 kosher and Crawford, op. cit., supra, note 1, 70.
24 Ibid., 69 .
2s C. B. Cooke, Jr., Why Rate Cases Cost Too Much, 12 Pub. Util. Fort. 16 (1933).
2 The Public and its Government (New Haven, 1930), 121.
27 Ibid., oo.
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the utility to the community are apt to become more and more strained.
And a victory for the utility, may in the end, prove more disastrous than
defeat would have been."
The conflict and chaos arising from disputes over valuation theories,
and the ineffectuality of attempts to control holding companies are dearly
the most serious defects of present-day utility regulation in the United
States.21 Neither of these problems has become acute in Great Britain.
The development of electrical holding companies in Scotland, the Mid-
lands, the Home Counties, and Wales-Western England, however, has
begun to cause concern to the Electricity Commission and the Ministry of
Transport. American interests and a Scotch public utility official have set
the pace. Although the holding company device has created some unsolved
problems in the electricity field, holding companies generally would not
seem to be a source of serious concern to British regulation.
Unlike the United States, British regulation is not complicated by state
lines. Territorial restrictions on the jurisdiction of the regulatory tribunal
are therefore not found. Moreover, holding companies are placed in an
unfavorable position because they cannot become "statutory" companies;
they may be formed only under the Companies Acts. This means that
they cannot obtain rate-fixing powers and other privileges appertaining to
statutory public utilities. Holding companies are not subject to regulation,
but if the regulatory commission finds in the accounts of an operating
undertaking any charge which has been imposed by a holding company,
and if said charge is considered unreasonable, the permissible earnings of
the operating company may be reduced by the amount of the disallowed
charge. From this decision there is no legal recourse. Nevertheless, the
rates of electrical utilities controlled by holding companies are generally
higher than those of other companies, and in several cases they are twice
as high as those of municipally-owned services. In all probability, the
holding company development will create problems of more serious im-
port, particularly in the administration of the law, than most British
officials realize at the present time.
Commission regulation results in the distribution of responsibility
among three or more members; the result is that real responsibility is very
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. A single official can be criticized,
but it is almost impossible for the public to find the source of the difficulty
when from three to seven members hand down an unpopular decision.
28 Keezer and May, The Public Control of Business, c. 7, 9; H. W. Laidler, Concentration in
American Industry (New York, i931), Part III; W. E. Mosher, Electrical Utilities, c. 3, 4;
Mosher and Crawford, Public Utility Regulation, c. 23-28; Lilienthal and Handler, Recent
developments in the law of public utility holding companies, 3i Col. L. Rev. 189 (I931).
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Where governmental administration has been improved, the independent
commission has usually been abolished or else has been attached in an ad-
visory capacity to a single-headed department. This is the system which
is found universally throughout Europe and the Scandinavian countries.29
The movement for administrative integration, and the demand for
"public-minded" utility regulation, may lead to important modifications
or changes in the status of detached public utility commissions in the
United States. The change in Oregon may be a significant omen. In the
federal government, it would be surprising if, during the course of the next
few years, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Com-
mission, the Federal Radio Commission, and the Federal Power Commis-
sion were not drawn into organic connection with major administrative
departments of the government. The Federal Trade Commission and thd
Federal Radio Commission are under the wing of the Department of Com-
merce, for many practical intents and purposes, already. A Department of
Communications having general coordinating control over the Post Office,
telegraphs, telephones, radio, and perhaps electrical power, would be able
to absorb the Federal Radio Commission and the Federal Power Commis-
sion. This sort of functional organization has been adopted in several of
the leading European countries. Coordination of policy and public con-
trol are obtained thereby, while at the same time the services within the
constellation are given a high degree of operating freedom. The same solu-
tion might be applied to national transport. A Department of Transporta-
tion might be responsible for railway, bus, river, and air facilities. The
Interstate Commerce Commission would naturally occupy a central posi-
tion in such an organization. The creation of the office of Federal Coordi-
nator of the railways already points in the direction of a more comprehen-
sive coordination and greater administrative integration.
The leaven which has been rapidly changing the character of British
public utility control in recent years is still at work. Each week the de-
mand for a coordinated scheme of national transport gains adherents and
seems nearer fulfillment. The ruinous competition between road and rail,
which has reached an acute stage since the 1926 strike, appears to be in-
soluble except by national coordination. Newspaper correspondents re-
port that a National Transport Board, an operating rather than a regu-
latory body, appears imminent. If so, the two railway tribunals and the
thirteen traffic commissions would probably be discontinued or else trans-
formed into advisory bodies connected with the Ministry of Transport.
Moreover, when the national electricity scheme has been entirely com-
29 Orren C. Hormell, Public Utilities Abroad (Syracuse, 1930).
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pleted (in from three to five years), the Electricity Commission will prob-
ably be considered an extra spoke in the wheel. Its raison d'etre is open
to question now. What regulatory functions it possesses are duplicated in
the Ministry of Transport.
Although prophecy is dangerous, it would appear that Victorian regu-
lation has almost reached the end of the trail in Great Britain. Regula-
tion has proved timid, and on the whole not as effective as in the United
States. Profits of from ten to fifteen per cent are still commonly earned
by electricity companies. The quality of service varies widely in different
parts of the country. The administrative tribunals are handicapped by
the absence of technical staffs of their own. They must call upon the
Ministry of Transport or private consultants. Failure to effect sufficient
coordination between the regulatory tribunals and the Ministry of Trans-
port has led to the loss of initiative and responsibility.30 Independent reg-
ulatory tribunals are out of place in a responsible form of government.
National planning of basic industries and public services, and the main-
tenance of uniform policies relative to all of them, seem to demand a cen-
tral administrative authority. The present maze of regulatory bodies can
never provide this element; instead it militates against coordination and
growth. What is needed is effective, centralized control over public util-
ities, along with the highest degree of operating freedom which is com-
patible with the public's interest. These objectives are much more likely
to be obtained by the new public utility trusts and the mixed undertak-
ings than by the chess game of regulation.
THE PUBLIC UTILITIES TRUST AND THE MIXED UNDERTAKING
A great deal of public utility history has been made in Great Britain
during the past six or seven years. A national plan for the generation and
transmission of electricity has been worked out and put into operation.
All of London's transport facilities, steam railways, subways, tramways,
and buses have been formed into an integrated monopoly. A single na-
tional authority has been entrusted with the preparation and broadcasting
of all radio programs. These are far-reaching developments, but they are
probably only the first of several others. As an American journalist,
William Hard, has said, "the whole intellectually dominant element in
Britain's Conservative party are headed straight toward a national gov-
ernmental planning of Britain's entire basic economic life."
All of the ventures in national planning mentioned above have taken
3o On the central position occupied by the Ministry of Transport in British public utility
control see Herbert Morrison, Socialization and Transport (London, 1933), 171 ff.
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place since 1926. One of the most significant features of the whole develop-
ment is that a form of organization known as the "public utility trust" or
the "public corporation" has been selected in each case.3'
The British have turned their backs on regulation. Experience has
taught them that the best results are obtained through responsible admin-
istration rather than by cumbersome regulation; that voting stockholders
and speculative profits should be eliminated from public utilities; and that
public service officials are trustees for the government and for the con-
sumers.
The principles underlying the public utility trust are these:
i. Services which are indispensable to the consumer and which are
vital to national economic development should be brought into a monop-
oly. The elimination of the detrimental results of competition, and dis-
satisfaction with prices and practices which are permitted under regula-
tion are the principal inducements.
2. The profit motive must be eliminated, and the public service princi-
ple must be put in its place.
3. There are no voting stockholders in the newer public utility trusts.
So long as the management is controlled by the stockholders, the profit
incentive cannot be eliminated. Directors are replaced by government-
appointed Trustees.
4. Fixed interest payments are established by the statutory provisions
creating the quasi-governmental monopoly. Stock in expropriated under-
takings is converted into stock in the public utility trust. Interest pay-
ments in different undertakings vary between three and five per cent.
Stock takes on the characteristics of bonds. The stock is not tax-exempt.
Sinking fund provisions are established according to which the stock is re-
tired at definite periods ranging from twenty to sixty years.
5- Surplus earnings are either used to reduce charges to the consumer or
are turned into the general coffers of the government.
3
2
6. Definite statutory limitations and business principles are established,
eliminating the necessity of constant and meticulous supervision by gov-
ernment departments. The removal of the profit incentive is the most im-
portant of these.
7. Trustees, usually five or seven in number, are appointed by the gov-
ernment on the basis of their public spirit and their general ability. Inter-
"1 The Port of London Authority (r9o8) is a forerunner of the moden public utility trust.
The Metropolitan Water Board is another good example of etrlier experience with the public
corporation.
32 The former alternative is usually the case, the only notable exception being broadcasting
which derives its revenue from a licensing system administered by the Post Office.
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est representation and party selection are expressly eliminated. BothLabor
and Conservative Governments have appointed more trustees from other
parties than from their own. This has become a tradition, and it is one of
the most necessary features of the trustee principle.
8. The business management of the public service undertaking is en-
trusted to a general manager, who is appointed by the trustees. The sal-
aries of the trustees and of the general manager are fixed by law. The
general manager is given a wide discretion in appointments, organization,
contracts and management. The selection of a manager of great ability
and initiative is one of the most essential requirements of the public cor-
poration. Fortunately the British have produced administrators of high
calibre in men like Sir John Reith and Lord Ashfield. The employees of
the public utility trust are not subject to civil service requirements. It has
been customary, however, to adopt some of the best features of the Civil
Service system.
9. The Minister in charge of the department of government most close-
ly related to the work of the public utility trust has, as representative of
the legislature, an ex officio responsibility in relation to the public corpora-
tion. Thus the Postmaster-General has statutory duties in relation to the
British Broadcasting Corporation, as has the Minister of Transport in
connection with the Central Electricity Board. The Minister, however,
does not interfere in policy or in management. In Parliament he answers
only such questions pertaining to the public corporation as he chooses; in
practice these are very few and relate only to fundamental issues. The
ministerial link is established as a reserved power which can be used if
necessity requires it.
io. Treasury approval is required before additional securities can be
floated, and a governmental audit may be demanded if the Government is
not satisfied with the regular audit of a firm of certified public account-
ants. In addition, periodic financial reports are required which must be
sold to the public at a small cost.
The above generalizations are subject to modification in some cases.
Transport, electricity planning, and broadcasting present problems which
cannot be solved by the application of stereotyped formulae. In the case of
the London Transtport Board, for example, appointments are made by so-
called "Appointing Trustees" who are selected from various professional,
economic, and governmental groups. 33 This appears to be a thoroughly
bad principle, because it complicates the administrative machinery and
completely destroys responsibility for appointments. There is a wide-
33 Herbert Morrison, Socialization and Transport, 161 ff.
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spread belief in Great Britain that this particular feature will be removed
within the near future. The general ideas underlying the public utility
trust, however, are substantially as stated above.
The results so far obtained from the operation of the newer public
utility trusts are, on the whole, encouraging. Most men in British public
life, including a section of the Labor party 4 under the leadership of Her-
bert Morrison, a former Minister of Transport, subscribe to the view ex-
pressed in these words: "the public utility authority (trust) is the modern
conception of dealing with monopoly services ..... The public utility
authority is the organ to which men both of socialistic and individualistic
predispositions are turning to conduct such services as are agreed to be
best conducted as monopolies. '35
The eventual success of the public utility trust would appear to depend
upon several important factors, the principal ones being whether ade-
quate incentives have been provided, whether the plan can be kept free
from business and political favoritism, whether first-rate leadership can
be secured, and whether employees will be guaranteed a fair deal. Only
the first two of these points will be discussed at this time.
The elimination of the profit motive should improve the quality of serv-
ice, rather than act as a damper on the spirits of the officials. 36 This obser-
vation seems to be particularly applicable to Great Britain, where men
of the greatest abilities have for generations been trained for public serv-
ice instead of for profit-making. The fact that the most able young men
in Great Britain enter the Civil Service is the best proof of this. The pub-
lic service ethic has not captured American leaders so extensively as it
has in Great Britain, but rapid changes in this direction have set in since
1929. It does not seem too sanguine to expect that Americans will de-
velop a new standard of values during the next few years, as a result of
which public service will dominate the country's government and business
leaders, replacing the cynical philosophy of selfishness which brought the
country to collapse in 1929.
In order to be run on "business-like" lines a commercial service does not
need to make profits. On the other hand, all public utility trusts in Great
Britain are required to be self-supporting. The consumer must pay for
what he gets, and there is no question of any subsidy or guarantee from
34 Within the past two years the majority of the Labor party have grown unfriendly toward
the public utility trust, because they do not find in existing examples of the public corporation
adequate provision for labor representation in policy-formulation and management.
3s Lord Wolmer, Post Office Reform (London, 1932), 201.
36 on this subject see my recent article entitled, The Potential Incentives of Public Em-
ployment, 27 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 628 (1933)-
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the taxpayer. The financial obligation resting on the management is to
maintain the credit of the undertaking; so that it can raise capital as and
when it needs it, and on favorable terms. So long as this is secured, all
surpluses go, in effect, to the consumer.
One discovery that invariably impresses British and European visitors
in the United States is the average American's cynicism regarding trustee-
ship in public life. Foreign observers are no doubt correct in stating that
American cynicism is due largely to self-delusion as a people. We get what
we expect, (or what we are taught to expect); if we demanded more we
should probably get more, just as other peoples do. The British expect
public utility trusts to be free from business and political wire-pulling;
most Americans would expect the opposite. It is generally agreed that
British public utility trusts are freer from patronage and log-rolling than
are most private business concerns. Only government undertakings, like
the Post Office, telegraphs, and telephones, set a higher standard in this
regard. The only respect in which the disinterestedness of the public util-
ity trust is really threatened is in its relations with closely allied com-
mercial interests, such as manufacturers of electrical equipment, or in the
temptation to spend large sums on newspaper publicity in order to prevent
hostile criticism.
Generally speaking, the source of corruption in public office is the profit
motive of organized interests who succeed in electing and controlling their
candidates, and not the innate perversity of human nature. Government
offices, and public utility trusts, are more likely to get "disinterested"
(i.e. public-spirited) service than are privately-owned utilities. This is one
of the great advantages of government administration of economic serv-
ices as compared with government regulation of private corporations.
Government has made a much greater success of running municipal light
plants than it has of public utility regulation.17 Dishonesty and anti-social
practices can be shielded behind the maze of regulation much more suc-
cessfully than they can in the simplicity and the publicity of public cor-
porations or government departments.
The mixed undertaking has several points in common with the public
utility trust. It is a quasi-governmental corporation, it possesses monop-
oly privileges, and public control is exercised primarily from within rather
than from without. The principal differences are that the government
owns a portion of the investment, appoints some of the officials, and de-
cides disagreements arising between government and private directors by
37 Cf. Frederick L. Bird, The Management of Small Municipal Lighting Plants (New York,
1932), and Martin G. Glaeser, Los Angeles Bureau of Power and Light, 9 Jour. Land & Pub.
Ufil. Econ. 217 (1933).
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an appeal to higher government officials. A mixed undertaking is a public
utility service in which the government and a private company jointly
subscribe the stock and cooperatively manage the service. 38
The plan became popular in Germany before the war. Today almost
every country in Europe, including Great Britain, has established mixed
undertakings. Since the war the growth of mixed enterprises has been one
of the most significant features of economic development in Western
Europe. The outstanding examples are found in the fields of electricity,
gas supply, and transport; but mixed undertakings also provide garage
service and even milk supply. In Germany the government's share of the
financial outlay usually represents more than fifty per cent of the net in-
vestment, while in France the law restricts the government's participa-
tion to forty per cent. In all countries, however, the government is amply
represented on the board of directors and in the management, and reserves
the right to overrule the representatives of the private stockholders in
case of fundamental disagreement.
Due to the fact that the British have developed a distinctive form of
public utility of -their own, the public utility trust, the number of mixed
undertakings which exist in Great Britain is much smaller than in most
European countries. Then too, until recently the British possessed very
little knowledge of mixed undertakings on the continent.39 Examples of
the mixed corporation which exist in Great Britain are the Manchester
Ship Canal, the Sheffield suburban transport service, the Southampton
Harbor Board, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Two of these under-
takings have been discussed in Sir William Hart's article, but a great deal
of interesting research on the subject remains to be done.
Several distinct advantages may be attributed to the mixed undertak-
ing. In the first place, public control is exercised from within, instead of
by establishing a regulatory body apart from the utility. Simplicity of
administrative organization and non-interference with management are
made possible. A private company which has been unable to raise funds
for desirable capital expenditures has frequently been enabled to do so by
a pooling of interests with the government. Securities in mixed undertak-
ings are backed up by public credit and hence come to be considered "gilt-
edged." On the other hand, communities which are anxious to extend
government ownership of essential services, but which are limited for fi-
38 For a brief analysis see Marshall E. Dimock, Les Entreprises Mixtes, 2o Nat. Muni. Rev.
638 ('93'). This article contains additional references.
39 So far as the writer is aware the first and only article which has appeared on the subject in
British journals is Sir William Hart's, Mixed Undertakings, io Public Administration 138
(1932).
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nancial reasons, can make an investment in a public utility service with the
idea of increasing it later. This has been the history of mixed enterprises in
Germany. The tax-payers obtain a portion of monopoly profits. Then
too, partial government ownership and ample government control are se-
cured, while at the same time the experience and acumen of business man-
agement are preserved.
The disadvantages of the mixed authority are that it may lead to
clashes between representatives of private and government interests, re-
sulting in vacillation and inefficiency. So far as the writer has been able to
ascertain, however, this theoretical objection has not been confirmed in
practice in very many cases throughout France and Germany. Moreover,
the management of mixed undertakings in Great Britain is considered very
satisfactory. The Manchester Ship Canal Company has been the out-
standing success. 40 Another criticism which may be brought against the
mixed undertaking, however, is that the government's financial partici-
pation in the undertaking encourages the earning of large profits, and that
hence the consumer's interests are not as well protected as under the public
utility trust form of organization. The basic choice between the two
types of utility organization seems to depend on whether direct participa-
tion in management by the government, as provided in the mixed under-
taking but not in the public utility trust, affords a superior opportunity
for effective public control and hence offsets the possible objection of hav-
ing the government seek large profits as a means of reducing taxes or as a
means of supporting other government services.
These are by no means the only important factors entering into public
utility management. Forms of organization and methods of control are
extremely important, but ultimately institutions are made by men, and
by the ideas and attitudes of the community. A comparison of manage-
ment in regulated utilities, in public utility trusts, and in government de-
partments reveals that propagandist views relative to the intrinsic char-
acter of service under one form of organization and another are usually
greatly exaggerated. All factors considered, the Post Office's management
of British telephones, in which the department is assisted by a firm of pub-
lic relations consultants, probably surpasses that of any other public util-
ity in Great Britain.4'
Our standards of comparison depend upon what we consider desirable.
There is a danger that certain elements will be overemphasized to the ex-
clusion of other necessary criteria. In the field of public utility develop-
40 F. A. Eyre, The Manchester Ship Canal Company, 6 The Listener, 446 (i93i).
4' The reader is referred to chapters four and five of my book, British Public Utilities.
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ment there is a peculiar need for constant philosophical consideration, and
for emphasis on underlying problems of administration. Some of the
hypotheses which, in view of foreign experience, deserve attention in
American public utility growth, may be stated as follows. In the first
place, public utilities should be administered as public services, instead of
as sources of speculative profit. This may sound axiomatic, but American
practices are largely disillusioning. A form of public utility organization
can be established, however, in which limited dividends are incorporated
as the fundamental feature. In the second place, simplicity of organiza-
tion and definite responsibility should be worked toward as goals of public
utility control. Again, one of the most important tests of a successful
public utility is its public relations atmosphere. This should not be con-
fused with attempts to hoodwink, stifle, or propagandize the public.
The personnel factor is all-important. Coordinators and technicians are
indispensable if efficient service is to be secured, but these abilities should
be coupled with a social philosophy built upon the public service ethic.
Finally, a public service enterprise should protect the interests of its em-
ployees and provide room for the utilization of their abilities in manage-
ment.
The United States affords a wonderful opportunity for variety and ex-
perimentation in public utility organization, management, and control.
In these forty-eight laboratories of ours there might be public utility
trusts, mixed undertakings, and entirely new forms of public service under-
takings. The only alternative is not between private corporations and
government departments, between regulation and government ownership.
With our flair for invention, it is surprising that we Americans have not
been in the vanguard of nations which are developing new techniques of
economic development and social planning. Perhaps, now that leagues of
municipalities have developed a corporate spirit, and now that regional
schemes have been put under way at Muscle Shoals and at Boulder Dam,
some new developments in public utility organization will occur. In the
next decade good administration is likely to become much more important
than regulation. This is the principal lesson to be learned from experience
in other countries.
